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The present studies investigate morality’s influence on aesthetics and one potential 
moderator of that influence: genre. Study 1 finds that people’s moral evaluation 
positively influence their aesthetic evaluation of an artwork. Study 2 and 3 finds that 
this influence can be moderated by the contextual factor of genre. These results 
broaden our understanding of the relationship between morality and aesthetics, and 
suggest that models of art appreciation should take into account morality and its 
interaction with context. 
 
Alfred Eisenstaedt’s V-J Day in Times Square (1945) is perhaps one of the most 
iconic photographs from World War II. In the photograph, a sailor is kissing a 
woman in a white dress, with her hand on his chest, as the crowd (and the 
photographer) observes this passionate moment. The sailor had just disembarked 
and was celebrating his safe return home with his girlfriend. Her hand was lovingly 
caressing him as she received his long-awaited kiss. Eisenstaedt’s photograph 
perfectly captured this wonderful moment of humanity. Or so goes the myth that has 
accompanied this iconic photograph for decades. 
The reality has only been recently uncovered (Crates and Ribbons 2009). The 
sailor was indeed returning from the war, but like many sailors returning from the 
war, he was drunk. After getting off the ship, he grabbed a stranger on the street to 
plant his kiss onto. The woman in the white dress did not know the sailor. His kiss 
was not long-awaited, but unwanted. Her hand was not caressing him lovingly, but 
pushing him away. So instead of capturing a moment in which humanity was at its 
best, Eisenstaedt had in fact documented a moment in which humanity was at its 
worst. The reality of the photograph certainly prompts a moral evaluation different 
from that of the myth. But does it also prompt a different aesthetic evaluation? 
This article examines how people’s moral evaluations influence their 
aesthetic evaluations of artworks. The present studies investigate morality’s influence 
on aesthetics and one potential moderator of that influence: genre. Specifically, we 
test whether people will rate the same work as more aesthetically appealing when it is 
seen as more moral, and then we test whether different genres can affect how the 
morality of an artwork affects its aesthetic appeal.  
                                                
* The studies reported in this article were done around 2010-2011, before people started to take seriously replicability 
issues. This work has been presented at Yale University’s Experimental Philosophy Lab (November 2010), the Metro 
Experimental Research Group Conference at New York University (March 2011), Kansas State University’s 
cognitive and social psychology colloquium (November 2012), University of Cologne’s philosophy seminar (May 
2014), and The Moral Domain Conference at Vilnius University (October 2014). I have received excellent feedback 
from many people, especially from Jonathan Scott Phillips at the start of this project and from Jamie Luguri who 
suggested the paradigm for Study 2 and Study 3. For one reason or another, I was never really happy with the article, 
and did not try to submit it for publication until 2016. By then, people are (reasonably enough!) taking seriously 
replicability issues, and reviewers rightfully pointed out methodological worries with these studies such as small 
samples sizes. I still think there are some interesting ideas in this article, but it is also time to let it go. 
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1. Morality and Aesthetics in Philosophy 
 
The relationship between morality and aesthetics has been on philosophers’ minds. 
For example, David Hume (1757) noted that contemporary authors (of Hume’s time) 
have an aesthetic advantage over Homer because contemporary audiences do not 
share the Greeks’ moral evaluations of Homer’s rough heroes. That is, Hume seems 
to suggest that the lowered moral evaluation of Homer’s epic poems leads to lowered 
aesthetic evaluations of those works. In other words, the perceived moral vices of 
Homer’s epic poems turn out to be perceived as aesthetic vices too. 
 Since around the 1990s, contemporary philosophers have re-engaged with 
this question about morality’s influence on aesthetics under the guise of “ethical 
criticism of art”. Three main positions have developed. Art autonomists say that 
moral vices are aesthetically irrelevant: they do not constitute aesthetic vices or 
aesthetic virtues (Anderson & Dean 1998; Cooke 2014; Harold 2011; Posner 1997, 
1998). Art moralists say that moral vices are systematically aesthetic vices, and moral 
vices can never be aesthetic virtues (Booth 1998; Carroll 1996, 1998; Clifton 2013; 
Eaton 2001; Gaut 1998, 2007; Hanson 1998; Harold 2008; Kieran 2001; Mullin 2004; 
Nussbaum 1998; Stecker 2008). Art contextualists (also known as art immoralists) 
say that morality’s influence on aesthetics is highly context dependent; sometimes a 
moral vice is an aesthetic vice, sometimes a moral vice is aesthetically irrelevant, and 
sometimes a moral vice is even an aesthetic virtue (Eaton 2012; Gilmore 2011; John 
2005; Jacobson 1997, 2005; Kieran 2006). Despite decades of refinements and 
iterations, the ethical criticism of art debate appears no closer to being resolved. 
More surprisingly, no one in the debate has tried to gather empirical evidence for or 
against one position or another. 
 
2. Morality and Aesthetics in Psychology 
 
The relationship between morality and aesthetics has been on psychologists’ minds 
too. However, while philosophers have focused on morality’s influence on aesthetics, 
psychologists have investigated other aspects of the relationship between morality 
and aesthetics: aesthetics’s influence on morality, the cognitive overlap between 
moral and aesthetic judgments, and the comparative objectivity of morality and 
aesthetics. 
Aesthetics’s influence on morality has been systematically studied in an 
extensive literature on the beauty-is-good stereotype (Dion et al. 1972; cf. the meta-
analyses in Eagly et al. 1991 and Langlois et al. 2000). The beauty-is-good stereotype 
holds in a wide variety of domains, such as pedagogy and politics. This literature 
clearly demonstrates that people’s aesthetic evaluations positively influence their 
moral evaluations of persons.  
 Psychological commonalities between the processes that underlie moral and 
aesthetic judgments have also been studied, albeit to a lesser extent. For example, 
Tsukiura and Cabeza (2011) and Heinzelmann et al. (in prep) found that aesthetic 
and moral judgments share brain activities. People’s perception of the objectivity of 
morality and aesthetics has also been studied, albeit to an even lesser extent. For 
  3 
example, Goodwin and Darley (2008) found that people perceived morality as more 
objective than aesthetics (cf. Cova and Pain 2012). 
 We are aware of no research that directly and empirically addresses 
morality’s influence on aesthetics. Moreover, while the psychological research 
programs mentioned are suggestive of an interest on the topic, none of them can 
speak to this aspect of the relationship between morality and aesthetics. The 
perceived metaphysics of the two domains is orthogonal to their causality. Given the 
different directionality, establishing aesthetics’s influence on morality is insufficient 
for establishing morality’s influence on aesthetics. And, even though the cognitive 
overlap between moral and aesthetic judgments indirectly suggests that there would 
be some influence between morality and aesthetics, open questions remain about the 
directionality of that influence, the magnitude of that influence, as well as 
moderators of that influence.  
 
3. Overview of Studies 
 
The three studies reported in this article are starting points for addressing a 
conspicuous absence at the intersection of philosophers’ and psychologists’ 
investigations into the relationship between morality and aesthetics.  
Study 1 provided an initial test of the hypothesis that people’s moral 
evaluations can influence their aesthetic evaluations of artworks. We manipulated 
the moral valence associated with an artwork. We predicted that when evaluating the 
same artwork, participants will make different aesthetic evaluations due to the 
difference in moral valence.  
 Study 2 and 3 assessed a plausible moderator of morality’s influence on 
aesthetics: an artwork’s genre. In general, genre is a highly salient contextual factor 
in art appreciation. Moreover, previous research suggests that genre can vary the 
imaginability and fictionality of moral deviance in a story (Liao et al. 2014). To test 
the role of genre, we manipulated the musical component of a song. Study 2 and 3 
made different genre manipulations. Also, study 2 employed a dichotomous prompt 
while study 3 employed an ordinal-scale prompt.  
 




We recruited sixty adults from Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online labor market 
where people can be recruited for various tasks, including participating in social 
science studies. (See Paolacci and Chandler 2014 for an overview of the demographic 
characteristics of the Amazon Mechanical Turk participant pool, its validity for 
conducting social scientific research, and data quality comparisons with traditional 
university lab studies.) We restricted the participant pool to users with registered 
location in the United States. Participants were paid market rate. Thirty-two 
participants self-identified as male, twenty-seven self-identified as female, and one 
did not self-identify as either. 
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 We randomly assigned participants to one of two conditions in a between-
participant design that manipulated the moral valence of an artwork. Each condition 
contained thirty participants. In both conditions, participants viewed Victor 
Jorgensen’s photograph Kissing the War Goodbye (1945)—a lesser-known, but 
copyright-free photograph of the exact same scene as Eisenstaedt’s V-J Day in Times 
Square. In the positive moral valence condition, participants read the following text 
while viewing the photograph: 
 
This photograph was taken on V-J Day, 1945, when soldiers came home from 
World War II. George, the sailor, was excited and kissing Greta, his girlfriend, in 
celebration of his safe return. She had been waiting for his presence since he 
disembarked. She felt cherished by his kiss. 
 
In the negative moral valence condition, participants read the following text while 
viewing the photograph: 
 
This photograph was taken on V-J Day, 1945, when soldiers came home from 
World War II. George, the sailor, was drunk and kissing Greta, a total stranger, in 
celebration of his safe return. She had no idea of his presence until she was in his 
arms. She felt violated by his kiss. 
 
There are no other differences between the two conditions. 
 After viewing the photograph and reading the accompanying text, 
participants in each condition responded to the following two statements (1 = not at 
all, 7 = very much so), displayed in random order: 
 
 [aesthetic evaluation]  Do you find the photograph appealing? 
 [moral evaluation]  Do you think what George did was morally wrong? 
 
For the aesthetic evaluation statement, we chose ‘appealing’ in order to balance two 
considerations. On the one hand, we do not want participants to indicate a mere 
subjective liking. On the other hand, we also do not want participants to 
approximate what, say, what fine arts critics like. So, we chose ‘appealing’ to cue 




Participants in the positive moral valence condition found the photograph 
moderately appealing, M = 5.80, SD = 1.297. Participants in the negative moral 
valence condition found the photograph only slightly appealing, M = 4.63, SD = 
2.059. There was a moderate difference between the two conditions in participants’ 
aesthetic evaluation of the photograph, Mann-Whitney U = 294.500, z = -2.361, p = 
0.018, effect size r = 0.305. Non-parametric statistics were used because the 
distribution of participant responses to the aesthetic evaluation statement violated 
normality (figure 1), but parametric statistics delivers essentially the same verdict, 
t(48.886) = 2.626, p = 0.012, effect size r = 0.352. 
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There was a strong correlation between participants’ moral evaluation and 
aesthetic evaluation, r = -0.451, p = 0.001. That is, participants who judged George’s 
action to be more morally wrong also tend to judge the photograph to be less 
aesthetically appealing. Somewhat surprisingly, we found no statistically significant 
difference, p = 0.615, between the correlation coefficients for participants who self-
identify as male, r = -0.371, and participants who self-identify as female, r = -0.484. 
 
 




These initial results support the hypothesis that people’s moral evaluations can 
influence their aesthetic evaluations of artworks. In particular, we found that 
negative moral evaluations tend to lead to negative aesthetic evaluations. This 
finding is of interest to both philosophers and psychologists who are interested in 
the relationship between morality and aesthetics. 
 From a philosophical perspective, this finding contributes to empirically 
informing the ethical criticism of art debate. It shows that laypeople are typically not 
art autonomists in their actual evaluations, even if they might profess otherwise. 
However, it is compatible with both folk art moralism and folk art contextualism 
because both predicts that in some cases a negative moral evaluation can lead to a 
negative aesthetic evaluation. Of broader significance, insofar as one takes 
laypeople’s actual evaluations to be a guide to values, even if this guide is imperfect 
and defeasible, then this finding provides some support for philosophical art 
moralism and philosophical art contextualism over philosophical art autonomism. 
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 From a psychological perspective, this finding broadens our understanding 
of the causal relationships between morality and aesthetics. While the aesthetics-to-
morality direction has been extensively investigated, the morality-to-aesthetics 
direction has not. This finding suggests that the causal relationship is not 
unidirectional from aesthetics to morality, but bidirectional between the two value 
domains. The bidirectional causality is consistent with existing findings on cognitive 
overlaps between the processes that underlie both kinds of value judgments. 
 
5. Study 2 
 
The results in Study 1 rule out folk art autonomism but are not decisive with respect 
to folk art moralism and folk art contextualism. Hence, an open question remains 
regarding whether contextual factors can moderate morality’s influence on aesthetics. 
This article focuses on the contextual factor of genre because it is one contextual 
factor that is highly salient for art appreciation. Moreover, there exists recent 
research (Liao et al. 2014) that shows genre can affect morality’s influence on 
imaginability, which is closely related to art appreciation (Walton 1990), which in 
turn suggests that genre is a plausible contextual factor that can moderate morality’s 
influence on aesthetics. Finally, it has been explicitly suggested in the ethical 
criticism of art literature that genre can vary morality’s influence on aesthetics 
(Giovanelli 2007). 
 We changed the design for Study 2 and Study 3 to accomplish another goal. 
It is arguable that the positive and negative moral valences present in Study 1 do not 
concern the photograph at all, and are instead solely concerned with the sailor who 
was depicted in the photograph. We find this unconvincing, since the romantic (and 
morally positive) myth is often mentioned in evaluations of Eisenstaedt’s 
photograph. That said, it would be even better to construct a study in which the 
positive and negative moral valences can be clearly found in the artwork itself. Hence, 
for Study 2 and Study 3, we chose songs as our stimuli. This choice allowed us to 
manipulate genre with the musical component, and contrast opposing moral 




We recruited another group of sixty adults from Amazon Mechanical Turk. We 
restricted the participant pool to users with registered location in the United States. 
Participants were paid market rate. We introduced an instructional manipulation 
check (Oppenheimer et al 2009), and excluded participants who failed it. Fifty 
participants remained. Eighteen participants self-identified as male and thirty-two 
self-identified as female.  
 We randomly assigned participants to one of two conditions in a between-
participant design that manipulated the genre of an artwork. The ballad condition 
contained twenty-three participants and the hip hop condition contained twenty-
seven participants.  
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In each condition, participants were given a 30-second music clip of a song 
in a foreign language, so that the actual lyrics would not be recognizable. 
(Specifically, we chose Taiwanese for its obscurity to the American sample; responses 
confirmed that no participant was able to even identify the language.) Participants 
were then instructed to examine two sets of “translated” lyrics: one with positive 
moral valence and another with negative moral valence (Appendix). Specifically, 
participants were told that since the lyrics are translated, they should focus on the 
content and ignore surface features such as vocabulary and rhyme. We varied the 
moral valence of the lyrical component within each condition in order to control for 
the fact that people may simply like different music—or, indeed, different musical 
genres—to different degrees. 
After listening to the music clip and reading the “translated” lyrics, 
participants responded to the following forced-choice question:  
 





Participants in the ballad condition overwhelmingly judged that the song would be 
more appealing with the positive moral valence lyrics than with the negative moral 
valence lyrics (91%). By contrast, a lesser percentage of participants in the hip hop 
condition judged that the song would be more appealing with the positive moral 
valence lyrics than with the negative moral valence lyrics (67%). There is a moderate 
difference between the two conditions, X2(1) = 4.393, p = 0.036, effect size Cramer's 
V = 0.296 (figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Proportion of aesthetic evaluation responses between conditions in Study 2 
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5.3. Discussion 
 
This result provides further evidence for the hypothesis that people’s moral 
evaluations can influence their aesthetic evaluations of artworks. More importantly, 
they show that the magnitude of this influence is sensitive to contextual factors such 
as genre. The manipulation of a song’s musical genre moderates the influence that 
the moral valence of lyrical content on participants’ aesthetic evaluation of the song. 
The result on genre’s moderation of morality’s influence on aesthetics is in 
congruence with previous theoretical and empirical research on genre’s relevance for 
art appreciation. Although this result provides further data for the ethical criticism 
of art debate, insofar as one takes laypeople’s actual evaluations to be a guide to 
values, its interpretation requires care. On the one hand, this result shows that 
laypeople are indeed sensitive to contextual factors, which lends some support to 
folk art contextualism. On the other hand, this result does not show that genre can 
invert the valence of morality and aesthetics—that is, turn a moral vice into an 
aesthetic virtue—and so it does not directly threaten folk art moralism. Sophisticated 
versions of philosophical art contextualism and philosophical art moralism can both 
accommodate this result. 
 
6. Study 3 
 
Study 3 follows up on Study 2 to assess the robustness of the genre moderator effect. 
We chose two new genres and two new sets of lyrics. Moreover, we changed the 
aesthetic evaluation question from forced-choice to ordinal scale. The study design 




We recruited another group of sixty adults from Amazon Mechanical Turk. We 
restricted the participant pool to users with registered location in the United States. 
Participants were paid market rate. We introduced an instructional manipulation 
check, and excluded participants who failed it. Fifty-eight participants remained. 
Thirty-two participants self-identified as male and twenty-six self-identified as 
female.  
 We randomly assigned participants to one of two conditions in a between-
participant design that manipulated the genre of an artwork. The pop condition 
contained twenty-six participants and the metal condition contained thirty-two 
participants.  
In each condition, participants were given a 30-second music clip of a song 
in a foreign language, so that the actual lyrics would not be recognizable. 
Participants were then instructed to examine two sets of “translated” lyrics: one with 
positive moral valence and another with negative moral valence (Appendix). 
Specifically, participants were told that since the lyrics are translated, they should 
focus on the content and ignore surface features such as vocabulary and rhyme.  
  9 
After listening to the music clip and reading the “translated” lyrics, 
participants responded to the following question on a seven-point scale, ranging 
from the title of one set of lyrics to the title of the other set of lyrics: 
  
[aesthetic evaluation]  Which set of lyrics do you think would make the song 
more appealing? 
 
For analyses, we used the scale on which 1 corresponds to the positive moral valence 
lyrics and 7 corresponds to the negative moral valence lyrics. However, for 
presentation to participants, the anchors were counterbalanced. Scores from reverse 




Participants in the pop condition found that the positive moral valence lyrics would 
make the song more aesthetically appealing, M = 1.46, SD = 1.272. Participants in the 
metal condition also found that the positive moral valence lyrics would make the 
song more aesthetically appealing, but to a much lesser extent, M = 2.72, SD = 2.232. 
A visual inspection of the distribution of participant responses showed a violation of 
normality; in particular, participant responses in the pop condition appeared to be 
right-skewed but participant responses in the metal condition appeared to be 
bimodal (figure 3). Non-parametric statistics showed a moderate difference between 
the two conditions in the moral valence of lyrical content’s influence on participants’ 
aesthetic evaluation of the song, Mann Whitney U = 265.000, z = -2.715, p = 0.007, 
effect size r = 0.356. (Again, parametric statistics delivers essentially the same verdict, 
t(50.694) = 2.693, p = 0.010; effect size r = 0.354.) 
 
 
Figure 3. Frequency of aesthetic evaluation ratings between conditions in Study 3 
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6.3. Discussion 
 
This result provides further evidence for the moral-influencing-aesthetic hypothesis 
and further evidence for the genre moderation effect. Study 3 complements Study 2 
by showing that the genre moderation effect is robust with respect to different genres, 
different lyrics, and different measures. However, it also suggests an additional layer 
of complexity with the genre moderation effect: the difference in distribution shapes 
between conditions suggests that there may be individual variations with respect to 
genre’s moderation of morality’s influence on aesthetics. 
 
7. General Discussion 
 
The present studies tested morality’s influence on aesthetics and genre as a 
moderator of that influence. These studies draw on theoretical research in 
philosophy on ethical criticism of art and genre’s role in art appreciation, and they 
fill in a lacuna in psychological research regarding the relationship between morality 
and aesthetics. Overall, the studies found that people’s moral evaluation of an 
artwork affects their aesthetic evaluation of that artwork, but also that genre can 
moderate the magnitude of this effect. Collectively, these results demonstrate a 
psychological phenomenon in the evaluation of an artwork that has been theorized 
but not proven. 
 Insofar as laypeople’s evaluations are imperfect, defeasible guides to values, 
these results show that philosophical art autonomism is less plausible than 
philosophical art moralism and philosophical contextualism. These results also 
challenge theorists to develop more sophisticated accounts that respect the empirical 
contours of this psychological phenomenon. For example, philosopher Noël Carroll, 
an art moralist, writes that “if the address of a work elicits the wrong moral 
assessments from the audience, or blocks the required ones, then the work will fail to 
secure emotive uptake and the work will be blemished on its own terms (that is to 
say, aesthetically)” (1998: 421). On Carroll’s account, audience’s negative moral 
evaluations systematically preclude their psychological involvements with the work, 
which then leads to lowered aesthetic evaluations. The results of present studies 
suggest that while Carroll’s account may be correct for some cases, it falls short as a 
uniform account of morality’s influence on aesthetics because it fails to take into 
account genre’s moderation of this relationship. Further research can clarify the 
relative plausibility of folk art moralism versus folk art contextualism, as well as 
empirically informing the theoretical debate between philosophical art moralism and 
philosophical art contextualism. 
 In addition to broadening our understanding of the relationship between 
morality and aesthetics, these results also increase our understanding of the 
psychology of art appreciation. While psychological models of art appreciation have 
become increasingly complex and nuanced (Leder et al. 2004, Bullot and Reber 2013, 
and Leder and Nadal 2014), none mentions the influence of. This state of the art is 
especially surprising given existing works on the cognitive overlap between moral 
and aesthetic judgments (Tsukiura and Cabeza 2011; Heinzelmann et al. in prep), 
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but perhaps explained by psychology’s near-exclusive focus on the aesthetics-
influencing-morality phenomenon (Dion et al. 1972). By investigating the causal 
relationship in the other direction, the present studies provide data points for 
revising psychological models of art appreciation to include morality, and potentially 
other normative factors too. Moreover, while context has been noted as an 
important factor in art appreciation (Bullot and Reber 2013, and Leder and Nadal 
2014), the results of present studies suggest the need for investigating the 
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Positive Moral Valence 
 
“Show You the Facts” 
 
Men say stupid things like 
“Women are not worth anything 
I use them and then I toss them” 
They don’t treat women like they should 
Let me show you the facts, get it right: 
Women are equals in every respect 




Another woman dropped down 
I wanted it, I got it, and I’m gone 
There’s another one around the corner 
I’ll do the same thing with her 
You know they want more from me 








We choose to take a stand now 
Push back violence and hatred 
As the sun, we are the light 
Unite as one, raise our voices 
Stop the pain and stop the tears 
I know happiness is what matters 




Make them feel pain until they die 
Blood soaks the ground like paint 
Like Picasso with axe and hammer 
To torture, to kill, to destroy 
They suffer, die, and decay 
I feel nothing for a million new ghosts 
 
 
